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THE DEMISE OF SUBSTANTIVE TIME
LIMITATIONS IN ILLINOIS
INTRODUCTION

In Illinois, the time period within which most personal actions must be commenced is prescribed in the general statute of
limitations.' If the plaintiff's complaint is not filed within the
time period specified in the general statute, the complainant's
action is barred although his right remains. 2 The general statute
of limitations is not, however, all-inclusive. There are certain
statutes that create causes of action unknown at common law
which specify their own time limitations.3 The time periods contained in these statutes have been construed by the Illinois
courts as conditions precedent that must be satisfied before a
cause of action arises. 4 Hence, the limitation period is an inte1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 13 (1977) provides: "The following actions
can only be commenced within the periods hereinafter prescribed, except
when a different limitation is prescribed by statute." Following this section
are §§ 14-27 which provide the specific time limitations for bringing various
types of actions.
2. See, e.g., Stenwall v. Bergstrom, 398 Ill. 377, 75 N.E.2d 864 (1947)
(general statute of limitations is not always binding); Levine v. Unruh, 99
Ill. App. 2d 94, 20 N.E.2d 521 (1968) (a general statute of limitations is a limit

on remedy only); Glenn v. McDavid, 316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942)

(statutes of limitations do not extinguish debt or property rights; they are

merely statutes of repose).
3. See, e.g., Dram Shops Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1977) ("Every
action hereunder shall be barred unless commenced within one year next
after the case of action accrued"); Wrongful Death Act, id. ch. 70, § 2(c)
(1977) ("Every such action shall be commenced within 2 years after the
death of such person"); Paternity Act, id. ch. 1063/, § 54 (1977):
No such action may be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the
birth of the child. However, where the person accused has acknowledged the paternity of the child by a written statement made under
oath or affirmation or has acknowledged the paternity of such child in
open court, prosecution may be brought at any time within 2 years from
the last time such acknowledgment was made or within 2 years from
the last time the person accused contributed to the support, maintenance, education and welfare of the child subsequent to such acknowledgment.
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, id. ch. 1211 , §
270(a), (e) (1977) ("Any action for damages under this Section shall be forever barred unless commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrued. .. ").
85, 124 N.E. 849 (1919).
4. See, e.g., Hartray v. Chicago Rys. Co., 290 Ill.
This case was one of the first instances in Illinois in which a specific time
limitation was given this type of interpretation. In constring the Injuries Act
(predecessor of the modern Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §
2(c) (1977)), the court stated:
It is a condition precedent to the right of recovery granted by this act
that the action be brought within one year after the cause of action ac-
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law that must be pleaded and
gral element of the substantive
5
satisfied by the plaintiff.

In the past, the Illinois courts have refused to apply the equitable doctrines of estoppel and waiver to bar the invocation of
specific time periods. 6 This denial follows from reasoning that
crues. In a statutory action like this, where the right is conditional, the
plaintiff must bring himself clearly within the prescribed requirements
necessary to confer the right of action. Inasmuch, therefore, as the limitation of the time in which to sue is considered not merely of the remedy but of the right of action itself and the cause of action exists subject
to the limitation, a declaration must allege or state facts showing that
the action is brought within the time prescribed by statute.
290 Ill. at 87, 124 N.E. at 850 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). See also
Carln v. Peerless Gas Light Co., 283 Ill. 142, 119 N.E. 66 (1918) (time limitation under Injuries Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1903) is a condition precedent); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 369 Ill. 222, 15 N.E.2d
838 (1938) (the limitation period of one year under the Injuries Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1937) is a condition precedent); Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn,
371 111. 203, 20 N.E.2d 280 (1939) (the time fixed by the Injuries Act, ILL. REV.
STAT ch. 70, § 1 (1937) for bringing an action is not a statute of limitations
but a condition precedent); Wilson v. Tromly, 404 111.307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949)
(court denied the assertion of a counterclaim based on the Injuries Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1947) because it was not brought within the specific one-year time limitation).
Lowrey v. Malkowski, 20 Ill. 2d 280, 170 N.E.2d 147 (1960) (an action
brought under the Dram Shops Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1977) must
be dismissed when not filed within the one-year period of limitation); Super
Valu Stores, Inc. v. Stompanato, 128 Ill. App. 2d 243, 261 N.E.2d 830 (1970)
(the statutory one-year period under the Dram Shops Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 43, § 135 (1967) is a condition precedent, thus an integral part of the right
of action).
Smith v. Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E.2d 478 (1938) (a judgment lien is
created by statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 77, § 1 (1937) and thus the time limitation within the statute is a condition precedent and not a statute of limitations).
Brown v. Box, 38 Ill. 2d 80, 230 N.E.2d 204 (1967) (the time limitation
under the Paternity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1063/, § 54 (1977) held a condition precedent to the right to bring the statutory action).
Spaulding v. White, 173 Ill. 127, 50 N.E. 224 (1898) (the time limitation
within the Probate Act of April 11, 1875 now found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 7
(1977) is a condition precedent and not a statute of limitations); Messenger
v. Rutherford, 80 Ill. App. 2d 25, 225 N.E.2d 94 (1967) (time provision in act
for filing claims against an estate is not a general statute of limitations).
5. See generallyHorsley & Cambill, Limitations and Special Defenses
Under the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 249, 267; Lederleitner,
Survey of Illinois Limits and LimitationA 3 J. MAR. J. 56, 56-57 (1969).
6. As the supreme court stated in Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 312, 89
N.E.2d 22, 25 (1949):
[A] suit brought under the Injuries Act does not come within any of the
other actions enumerated, but is sui generis, created by statute, and
independent of all others mentioned in the Limitations Act. Moreover,
section 12 [now § 13] of the Limitations Act expressly excludes the periods of limitation set out in the act from applying 'when a different limitation is prescribed by statute.' The time prescribed by the Injuries Act
for commencing a suit is one year, which has been construed as a condition precedent, so quite obviously the savings provisions contained in
section 19 [now § 201 and other sections of the Limitations Act have no
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rights derived from special statutory actions were created on the
condition that suits be brought within the time so specified. In
contrast, a general statute of limitations may be waived, or denied by estoppel because it applies only to remedies. 7 This interpretation of specific limitation periods as substantive elements
of their respective causes of action has caused hardships that
would not have arisen if the courts had interpreted these periods in the same fashion as time limits in a general statute of
limitations.8 When the limitation is viewed as substantive, even
though it is phrased in the same language as a general limitation, courts have denied causes of action and counterclaims that
would have been allowed under a procedural interpretation. 9 Although this interpretation exists today, the Illinois courts have
begun to develop rationales to circumvent such specific time
limitations.1 0
This comment reviews the development of the doctrine requiring courts to designate special statutory time limits as conditions precedent to bringing a cause of action. This comment
will then explain the rationale used by the Illinois courts to
avoid interpreting the time limitations in certain statutory actions as conditions precedent. The feasibility and desirability of
extending this rationale to other statutes are also explored, as is
the demise of the substantive interpretation of limitation periods.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF TIME LIMITATIONS

Time limitations for initiating legal actions first developed
in ancient Rome.1 No limitation period governed personal acreference to the time limit or condition in another statute creating a
new cause of action not existing at common law.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 310-11, 89 N.E.2d 22, 25 (1949),
in which the defendant was denied his counterclaim under the Injuries Act
(ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1947), same as present Wrongful Death Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1977)) due to the interpretation of the specific limitation period of the Act as a condition precedent. If the court had interpreted
the limitation period as a statute of limitations, the defendant's counterclaim would have been allowed under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 18 (1827) (this
section is the same today): "A defendant may plead a ... counterclaim
barred by the statute of limitations, while held and owned by him, to any
action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff under whom he
claims, before such... counterclaim was so barred ......
9. See note 4 supra
10. Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976); Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403 (1974). See notes 54101 and accompanying text infra
11. There is speculation that statutes limiting the time for bringing real
property actions existed in England as early as 1236. See 2 POLILACK AND
MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 81 (2d ed. 1898).
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tions, as rights in contracts and torts, in the early days of either
Roman law or the English common law. 12 Limitations for personal actions were subsequently created by statute; their origin
can be traced to 1623.13 The concept of time limitations on personal actions has spread during the past 350 years, and today,
is
the time within which most personal actions must be brought
14
state.
every
in
limitations
of
statute
general
a
governed by
The concept of statutory time limitations in Illinois developed from the equitable doctrine of laches. Time limitations are
based in part on the general observation that valid claims are
usually not neglected. If no action is commenced during a reasonable period of time, a presumption arises against the original
validity of the claim. 15 In addition, time limitations afford the
defendant a fair opportunity to investigate the circumstances
upon which liability against him is predicated while the facts are
accessible. 16 To the extent the span of time accumulates between the events creating the cause of action and the notification to defendant of his liability, the defendant's opportunity is
inversely diminished.
Statutes of limitations are statutes of repose; 17 they bar the
remedy but not the substantive right. They are designed to pre12. At early common law, the plaintiff had a perpetual cause of action.
However, certain safeguards were developed to protect parties, such as the
notion that an action in tort did not survive the plaintiff or defendant. See,

e.g., Sherfey v. City of Brazil, 213 Ind. 493, 13 N.E.2d 568 (1938); Brooklyn
Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N.Y. 210, 90 N.E. 834 (1910). See generally Atkinson,

Some ProceduralAspects of the Statute of Limitations 27 COLUM. L. REV.
157 (1927); Satter, Limitations in Illinois: The Tolling and Borrowing
Provisions,2 DEPAUL L. REV. 225 (1953); Note, Developments in the Law Statutes of Limitations,63 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1950); Case-Comment, World
of Fashion v. Dun & Bradstreet,Inc, 10 J. MAR. J. 359 (1977).
13. The first recognized statute imposing a limitation period for bringing a personal action was The Limitation Act, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16. See 2
POLLACK AND MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 81 (2d ed. 1898).
14. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 13 (1977); N.Y. McKINNEY [Const.]
Art. 2, § 214 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 15-2 (1967); Wis. STAT. §
893.01 (1957). These citations afford the reader a sample of the types of limitations statutes in the United States. See also Littel, A Comparison of the
Statutes of Limitation4 21 IND. L.J. 23 (1945).
15. Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 70 (1873). Mr.
Justice Field, writing for the majority, stated that a presumption arises
against the validity of a claim if enforcement is not demanded within a reasonable time. These presumptions are codified into statutes of limitations
which act as a positive bar. Accord Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1868).
16. See Cross v. Janes, 327 Ill. 538, 158 N.E. 694 (1927) (statutes of limitations are based on the theory of laches which is based on fairness).
17. E.g., People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 156 N.E. 303 (1927) (statutes of limitations in civil actions are statutes of repose); Glenn v. McDavid, 316 Ill.
App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942) (statutes of limitations are statutes of repose in
that they bar the right to sue for recovery but do not bar the debt or property right).
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vent the bringing of fraudulent and stale claims after unreasonable periods of time have elapsed. 18 Such limitations reflect the
public policy of the state. If the prescribed time period has expired, the complaining party is precluded from utilizing the
19
courts to enforce an otherwise valid claim.
Any type of time limitation on an action must be arbitrary to
some extent. Although the legislature may have reasons for allowing only six months to bring some actions and seven years to
bring others, the ultimate decision is arbitrary. After considering all reasons for limiting or prolonging an action, the legislature must decide a cut-off point that is purportedly fair to the
majority of people affected.
Three reasons or justifications for statutes of limitations are
generally cited: (1) to avoid the litigation of stale claims by
preventing the loss or impairment of evidence due to a lapse of
time;20 (2) to encourage diligence in bringing valid actions; 2 1 and
(3) to lend a degree of certainty to people's lives by wiping the
slate clean. 22 Considering these three principles in light of the

equitable theory of laches, it is a logical conclusion that statutes
of limitations were originally established with the perception
that fairness should pervade among the competing interests of
both parties.
DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DISTINCTION

23
General statutes of limitations are procedural in nature.

18. See, e.g., Cross v. Janes, 327 Ill. 538, 158 N.E. 694 (1927).
19. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
20. E.g., Mosby v. Michael Reese Hosp., 49 Ill. App. 2d 336, 340, 199
N.E.2d 633, 636 (1964):" A statute of limitations is designed to prevent recovery on stale demands. It is a statute of repose which gives a defendant a
reasonable opportunity to investigate a claim and to prepare his defense. .

. ."

Statutes of limitations afford parties protection from loss of evi-

dence due to" death of witnesses, failure of memory, loss of records and
destruction of vouchers after a lapse of time." Satter, Limitationsin Illinoi.

2 DEPAUL L REV. 225, 228 (1953).
21. E.g., Trainor v. Koskey, 243 Ill. App. 24 (1926).
22. [T] he foundation of the acquisition of rights by lapse of time is to
be looked for in the position of the person who gains them, not in that of
the loser .... A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own
for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being
and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act and trying to
defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better
justification than the deepest instincts of man.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv.457, 477 (1897).
23. E.g., Hilberg v. Industrial Comm'n 380 Ill. 102, 105, 43 N.E.2d 671, 673
(1942) ("The law is well settled that provisions for limitation of actions are
procedural in their nature. . . ."). In a recent case dealing with whether to
apply the Illinois statute of limitations or the limitations law of Yugoslavia,

which made causes of action based on war crimes perpetually actionable,
the federal court said that "statutes of limitations, in Illinois as elsewhere
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As a result of this construction, the courts have held that if the
general statutory time period has expired, only the party's rem24
edy is extinguished; his right to the cause of action remains.
This interpretation, whereby a party retains the right but not the
remedy, has enabled courts to use equitable doctrines to restore
a person's opportunity to receive a remedy. For example, acknowledgment by the defendant of the complainant's rights revives the remedy or waives the bar to the action; the right, which
25
is not lost by the running of the statute, can then be enforced.
Since general statutes of limitations bar26only the remedy and
not the right, they are statutes of repose.
The construction of general statutes of limitations as procedural in nature limited their applicability to the jurisdiction of
the legislature that enacted them. 27 At common law, a plaintiffs
action was not necessarily barred in the forum state although it
would have been barred in the state where the cause of action
arose. 28 Traditionally in conflict of laws cases, the statute of limitations of the forum state would control. 29 Thus, if a common
law cause of action arose in state A but the action was brought
in state B, the general statute of limitations of state B would
apply, even if it was longer than state A's time limitation. This
interpretation, however, could not be automatically applied to
those actions created by a state statute that contained within it a
specific limitation period.30 Under the procedural interpretation
of a statute of limitations, a cause of action brought pursuant to
a right created by state A's statute could be brought in state B
and state B's general statute would apply under the rule that
the statute of limitations of the forum state governed. The
United States Supreme Court considered this problem in The
...are 'procedural in their nature'...." Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549, 553
(7th Cir. 1977).

24. See, e.g., Fleming v. Yeazel, 379 Ill. 343, 40 N.E.2d 507 (1942) (statutes
of limitations bar the right to sue for recovery but do not extinguish the
debt or property right); Keener v. Crull, 19 Ill.
189 (1857); Glenn v. McDavid,
316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942) (a party may, by acknowledgment and a
promise to pay debt, remove the statutory bar of limitation).
25. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Statutes of
Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177 (1950).

26. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
27. This rule applied to both federal and state courts. See Townsend v.
Jemison, 50 U.S. 406, 420 (1850) (the Court decided that when an action ac-

crued in Mississippi but the suit was brought in Alabama, the proper stat-

ute of limitations to apply was that of the forum state). Accord, Kalmich v.
Bruno, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1977) (use statute of limitations of the forum in
deciding war crimes); Wetzel v. Hart, 41 Ill.
App. 2d 371, 374, 190 N.E.2d 619,
621 (1963) (statutes of limitations are governed by the laws of the forum).

28. Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. 406 (1850).
29. Id.
30. See note 3 supra for examples of such state statutes.
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Harrisburg.

The Court in The Harrisburganalyzed which limitation period would govern: that of the forum state, or that of the state
where the action arose. In deciding this issue, the Court, without
citing precedent, stated that when an action at law is created by
the statute of a state, a new legal liability is born. From the statute flows the right to sue for its enforcement, provided the suit
is brought within the time designated by the statute. The Court
construed the time period prescribed by the statute that created
the action as an element of the cause of action. 32 This marked
the first time that a limitation period that was part of a statute
which created a right unknown at common law was construed as
substantive rather than procedural.
The Harrisburgreasoning signified the origin of a trend toward the application of a foreign state's statute of limitations by
characterizing the statutory time period as substantive. 33 This
interpretation provided the courts with a means to circumvent
the common law rule that the statute of limitations of the forum
state would govern even though that time period would extend
the time within which the plaintiff could bring his action. Furthermore, the reasoning of The Harrisburg substantially narrowed the opportunity for forum shopping.
SUSPENSION OF THE TIME PERIOD

Although the length of time prescribed by a statute of limi31. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
32. In determining which state's statute of limitations governed, the

Court drew its answer from the statute creating the action. The Court said:
The statute creates a new legal liability, with the right to a suit for its
enforcement, provided the suit is brought within twelve months, and

not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought operates
as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy
Time has
alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at all ....
been made of the essence of the right, and the right is lost if the time is
disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as
limitations of the right.
Id. at 214.
33. Other decisions following this reasoning extended the "substantive"
label to other causes of action based on special statutes, provided the statutes contained their own limitations periods. See Atlantic Coast Line v.
Burnette, 239 U.S. 199, 201 (1915) (an action must fail when not brought
within limitations period of Federal Employer's Liability Act of 1908, 35 Stat
65); Ewing v. Risher, 176 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1949) (limitation period under
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1939), is a condition precedent to the
action); Matheny v. Porter, 158 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1946) (time limitation provision of the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C. § 925(c) (1942), is a
substantive element to the cause of action).
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tations generally acts as a bar to a party's remedy,34 courts in
various situations have not held limitation periods to be conclusive and have granted remedies even though the limitation period had already lapsed. 35 The equitable doctrines of waiver
and estoppel have been used occasionally to allow remedies
36
even when the time limitation has expired.
37
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Effecting a waiver requires words or conduct, either express or
implied, 38 indicating an intention to relinquish that right. 39 Thus
a party can decline to assert as a defense the general statute of
limitations. The jurisdictional basis of a court, however, can
never be waived. 4° Since time periods interpreted as substantive
confer jurisdiction upon the court, 41 the courts have not permitted parties to waive these time periods. 42 Thus, the courts have
allowed the waiver of procedural but not substantive time limits,
43
though the wording in both statutes is usually similar.

Estoppel, closely related to waiver,4 is an equitable princi34. See, e.g., Glenn v. McDavid, 316 Ill. App. 130, 44 N.E.2d 84 (1942).
35. See, e.g., Stenwall v. Bergstrom, 389 Ill. 377, 75 N.E.2d 864 (1942).
36. For a general guide as to when estoppel will act as a bar to the statute of limitations in Illinois, see generally Leiderleitner, Survey of Illinois
Limits and Limitations, 3 J. MAR. J. 56, 56-57 (1969).
37. See Pantle v. Industrial Comm'n, 61 Ill. 2d 365, 335 N.E.2d 491 (1975)
(defenses of waiver and estoppel may properly be raised and proved to nullify the effect of a statute of limitations).
38. See Gould v. Board of Educ., 32 Ill. App. 3d 808, 336 N.E.2d 69 (1975)
(court cites 18 I.L.P. Estoppel § 21, waiver may be express or implied).
39. National Bank of Albany Park v. Newberg, 7 Ill. App. 3d 859, 289
N.E.2d 197 (1972) (waiver requires an intentional relinquishment of a
known right).
40. For a general discussion of the problem of waiving rights under statutory provisions, see E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 540-42
(1940).
41. Substantive time periods are jurisdictional because if they are not
met, the action does not arise. See note 4 supra.
42. See Brown v. Box, 38 Ill. 2d 80, 230 N.E.2d 204 (1967) (defendant
could not waive his rights because jurisdiction did not exist under the Bastardy Act when action was not commenced within the statutory time period).
43. Compare Limitations, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (1977) ("Actions for
damages for an injury to the person,. . . shall be commenced within two
years next after the cause of action accured") with Wrongful Death Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 2(c) (1977) ("Every such action shall be commenced
within 2 years after the death of such person").
44. Courts often incorrectly use the terms "waiver" and "estoppel" interchangeably. Waiver is distinguished from estoppel in that, "[iI n waiver,
the essential element is an actual intent to abandon or surrender a right,
while in estoppel such intent is immaterial, the necessary condition being
the deception to his injury of the other party by the conduct of the one estopped." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Williams, 42 Ariz. 331, 333, 26 P.2d 117,
119 (1933). Illinois courts have also confused the terms "estoppel" and
"waiver." See, e.g., Cassidy v. Luburich, 49 Ill. App. 3d 596, 364 N.E.2d 315
(1977) (conduct of insurer constituted waiver by estoppel to raising defense
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ple that bars a party from asserting a legal right when that
party's conduct has induced another to act in good faith reliance
to his own prejudice. 45 Accordingly, a defendant may not assert
the general statute of limitations as a bar to an action when his
conduct has induced the plaintiff to forbear from bringing his
cause of action. 46 Estoppel exists independent of the statute cre47
ating the time limitation to suspend the running of the statute.
The test of whether estoppel is appropriate under the circumstances emphasizes the plaintiff's reasonableness in relying
upon the defendant's conduct.4 Today, courts will not adhere to
the general statute of limitations in situations where a plaintiff's
failure to bring his cause of action is attributed to his reliance
49
caused by the misleading conduct of the defendant.
The courts in Illinois have generally been hesitant to apply
equitable doctrines to bar special limitation periods due to the
reasoning of these periods as substantive elements of the statutory cause of action.5 0 To bar these conditions, in effect, would
App. 3d 1089, 1090,
of statute of limitations); Marks v. Johnston City, 21 Ill.
315 N.E.2d 342, 343 (1974) ("The conduct of a party against whom a waiver
of the statute of limitations is claimed must be such as to cause him to

change his position by lulling him into a false sense of security thereby

causing him to delay or waive his rights") (emphasis added).
App. 3d 26, 34, 351
45. See, e.g., DeGraw v. State Sec. Ins. Co., 40 Ill.
N.E.2d 302, 309 (1976) ("[E]stoppel embraces the concept of reliance, in

good faith, on the part of the party asserting estoppel, to the extent that
such party changes his position to his detriment in reliance upon the conduct of another. . .

.").

Accord, Moline I.F.C. Fin., Inc. v. Soucinek, 91 Ill.

App. 2d 257, 234 N.E.2d 57 (1968).

46. See generally Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation, 34
MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1935).

App. 2d 218, 243 N.E.2d 723
47. Sabath v. Morris Handler Co., 102 Ill.
(1968).
48. One court in Illinois has recently gone so far as to list six elements
which must be met before the doctrine of estoppel will apply:

(1)Words or conduct by the party against whom the estoppel is alleged
constituting either a misrepresentation or concealment of material
facts; (2) knowledge on the part of the party against whom the estoppel
is alleged that representations made were untrue; (3) the party claim-

ing the benefit of an estoppel must have not known the representations

to be false either at the time they were made or at the time they were
acted upon; (4) the party estopped must either intend or expect that his
conduct or representations will be acted upon by the party asserting
the estoppel; (5) the party seeking the benefit of the estoppel must
have relied or acted upon the representations; and (6) the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must be in a position of prejudice if the
party against whom the estoppel is alleged is permitted to deny the
truth of the representation made.
Stewart v. O'Bryan, 50 Ill. App. 3d 108, 109-10, 365 N.E.2d 1019, 1020-21 (1977).
Accord, National Tea Co. v. 4600 Club, Inc., 33 111. App. 3d 1000, 339 N.E.2d

515 (1975).
49. See generally Stewart v. O'Bryan, 50 II. App. 3d 108, 365 N.E.2d 1019
(1977).

50. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
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bar one of the essential elements needed to give the court jurisdiction. 51 Nevertheless, courts in Illinois have recently begun to
apply equitable doctrines to avoid the harsh results caused by
the strict application of limitation periods as conditions precedent. 52 In doing so, the courts in Illinois have focused their attention upon the legislative intent in creating the statutory
cause of action before deciding whether to construe a special
limitation period as procedural or substantive. By extending the

judicial inquiry to consider the factor of legislative intent, the
possibility that a substantive limitation period will defeat the
53
policy of the statute is severely reduced.

A NEW APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE TIME LIMrrs
In Wood Acceptance Co. v. King,54 the Illinois Appellate
Court dealt with an action brought under the Federal Truth in
Lending Act (FTLA). 55 The court was faced with virtually the
same question that the Illinois Supreme Court had earlier considered in Wilson v. Tromly;56 whether to allow a counterclaim
to a statutorily created action after the statutory limitation period had run. 57 In Wilson, the court reviewed the underlying
principles of counterclaims and found that counterclaims are
separate and distinct actions that must contain all of the elements of an original action.58 The court then followed the princi51. As noted earlier, the time element, when construed as substantive,
must be pleaded in order to give the court jurisdiction over the subject matter. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. If the court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction it has no power to decide the case. See Turner v.
President, Directors and Co. of the Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
52. See notes 54-94 and accompanying text infra.
53. See notes 95-106 and accompanying text infra.
54. 18 Ill. App. 3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403 (1974). The plaintiff sought to recover a judgment for a deficiency allegedly due after repossession and resale of defendant's car, which was purchased under a retail installment
sales contract. Defendant filed an answer denying that any money was due
plaintiff and filed a counterclaim praying for a judgment in the amount of
double the finance charge, as permitted under the Act. On plaintiff's motion, the counterclaim was dismissed for failure to file a claim within one
year from the date of the occurrence of the violation. Defendant appealed
from this order.
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1640(a), (e) (1976) [hereinafter referred to as
FTLA]. Section 1640(e) establishes the limitation period of the Act. It
states, "any action under this section may be brought in any United States
district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one
year from the date of the occurrence of the violation."
56. 404 Ill. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949).
57. In Wilson the court was interpreting a provision of the Wrongful
Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2 (1977); see note 3 suprafor relevant
language of these sections.
58. A counterclaim differs from an answer in that it is a separate cause
of action in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff. 404 Ill. at 307, 89
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ple that a limitation period found within a statute creating the
right is a substantive element of that cause of action. It concluded that the counterclaim could not stand unless all of its elements were pleaded. 59 Consequently, the counterclaim was
dismissed. 6°
Disregarding the rationale of Wilson, the Wood court's inquiry went beyond the language of the Act in order to determine
the general legislative intent surrounding the enactment of the
FTLA. 61 Though the court's research into the FTLA failed to dis62
close the purpose behind the statute's one-year filing period,
the court discovered that the essential purpose in passing the
Act was to safeguard the consumer in connection with the utilization of credit. 63 The FTLA's objective is to achieve fairness for
the consumer in credit transactions; the means to this end is by
penalizing wrongdoers. 64 The enforcement of this Act was to be
accomplished through the institution of civil actions.65 The court
reasoned that since the principle of "fairness"' 66 to the consumer
was used by Congress to devise the bill, that notion should govern any interpretation of the statute. 67 In this manner, the Wood
court concluded that the goal of the Act should not be frustrated
where the debtor's obligation is not stale, 68 and that the oneyear limitation was not such an integral part of the Act as to
outweigh the combined purposes of the FTLA and section 17 of
N.E.2d at 24 (1949). See 25 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
568 (2nd ed. 1903).
59. See 404 Ill. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949). See, e.g., Hartray v. Chicago Rys.
Co., 290 111.85, 124 N.E. 849 (1919) (time limitation period in Wrongful Death
Act construed as a condition precedent); Carlin v. Peerless Gas Light Co.,
283 Il.
142, 119 N.E. 66 (1918).
60. 404 Ill. 307, 314-15, 89 N.E.2d 22, 26 (1949).
61. It is acceptable practice for courts to look at committee reports and
conference reports of the legislature. The primary function of these reports
is to explain the meaning of the legislation considered. See generally E.
CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATURES 716-17 (1940); Chamberlain,
The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1933); Note, Conference Committee Materials in Interpreting Statutes, 4 STAN. L. REV. 257

(1952).

62. It is interesting to note that when the bill first went into committee,

it contained a one-year limitation period which was deleted but subsequently reinstated in the final draft. No reason could be found for these
changes. See generally Report on Truth in Lending Act, S. REP. No. 392, 90th

Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
63. 18 IM. App. 3d at 149, 309 N.E.2d at 405.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
65. The term "fairness" connotes the idea of reasonableness, which derives its meaning from equity. See Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n,

92 Utah 577, 580, 70 P.2d 738, 741(1937); WESTER'S
DICTIONARY 816 (unabr. ed. 1971).
66. 18 IM. App. 3d at 151, 309 N.E.2d at 405.
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67. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra.
68. 18 Ill. App. 3d at 151, 209 N.E.2d at 405.
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the Illinois Limitation Act. 69 The court buttressed its position
70
with decisions from other states involving the same question.
Thus, the Wood court, in seeking to further the underlying design of the FTLA, was constrained neither by prior judicial interpretation to the contrary 71 nor by the written manifestations of
72
Congress.
In Cessna v. Montgomery,73 the Illinois Supreme Court resorted to the doctrine of estoppel to prevent reaching the undesirable effect that accompanies interpreting special statutory
74
time periods as conditions precedent. The appeal in this case
arose from two independent actions by mothers seeking to es75
tablish the paternity of their illegitimate children. The trial
court dismissed the actions because they were commenced after
76
On appeal, the
the two-year limitation period had passed.
69. Id. The court buttressed its argument with the statutory provision
for counterclaims in Illinois, deeming that the legislative intent of this statute was to be "fair" to the defendants. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 17 (1977).
70. See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Drake, CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98, 939 at 88652 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973). Since the Wood decision several other
courts have grappled with the time limitation problem in the FTLA with the
same result. Accord, St. Mary's Hosp. v. Torres, 33 Conn. Supp. 201, 370 A.2d
620 (1976); Reliable Credit Serv. Inc. v. Bernard, 339 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. of
App. 1976); Collector's, Inc. v. Atrisco Ass'n, 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98779 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1974); Conrad v. Home & Auto Loan Co., 366 N.Y.S.2d
850 (1975). Contra, Hewlett v. John Blue Employees Fed. Credit Union, 344
So. 2d 505 (Ala. App. 1976); Hodges v. Community Loan &Inv. Corp., 133 Ga.
App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974); Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 29 N.C.
App. 78, 223 S.E.2d 831 (1976).
71. Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 89 N.E.2d 22 (1949); Carlin v. Peerless
Gas Light Co., 283 Ill. 142, 119 N.E. 66 (1918).
72. See note 55 supra.
73. 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976).
74. The court was interpreting the Paternity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1063 , § 43 (1975), currently found at ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40, § 1354 (1977).
75. In Cessna, the child was born July 25, 1970. Plaintiff, the mother, and
defendant had had sexual relations over a period of five years before the
child's birth and continued to see each other after that time. Plaintiff and
defendant lived together in 1972, from July until October. The paternity suit
was filed in March 1973. Plaintiff testified that defendant occasionally contributed to the support of the child and had orally acknowledged paternity
of the child.
The facts of the other case joined with Cessna were as follows. The
plaintiff charged the defendant with fathering her child, asserting that for
three and one-half years after the child's birth on March 4,1970, the defendant held himself out as the child's father. The defendant admitted paternity
in a signed and witnessed writing the day before the child was born and was
named as the father on the birth certificate. Defendant supported the child
until September 1973, and six months later plaintiff brought the action. 63
ill. 2d at 76-77, 344 N.E.2d at 449.
76. The Paternity Act states in part:
No such action may be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the
birth of the child. However, where the person accused has acknowledged the paternity of the child by a written statement made under
oath or affirmation or has acknowledged the paternity of such child in

19781

Substantive Time Limitations

supreme court reversed.
Although the plaintiff's major contentions were constitutional in nature,77 the court decided the case by addressing the
question of whether the two-year limitation provision was an integral element of the statutory action, which, if so concluded,
would have barred these paternity actions.78 Previously this

statutory time period had been construed as a condition precedent to the cause of action created by the Act. 79 The Cessna
court felt, however, that the facts in this case warranted the application of estoppel to prevent the defendant from pleading the
special statutory time period as a defense.8 0 This marked the
first time that the Illinois Supreme Court used estoppel to bar a
party from pleading a special statutory time period as a defense.
The Illinois Supreme Court had previously stated, in dicta,
that estoppel would not apply in an action brought pursuant to a
statute with its own substantive time limitation.8 ' In Cessna, the
court still contended that this proposition may be true for some
statutes, but not for actions under the Paternity Act. 82 The court
noted the practicalities inherent in paternity actions in rejecting
a strict adherence to the two-year limitation period acting as a
bar.83 Since most statutes that contain their own time limits deal
with interaction between strangers, there exists little reason to
suspect that a party will induce a stranger to forfeit his cause of
action. 84 In paternity suits, however, the plaintiff and defendant
open court, prosecution may be brought at any time within 2 years from
the last time such acknowledgment was made or within 2 years from
the last time the person accused contributed to the support, maintenance, education and welfare of the child subsequent to such acknowledgment. The time any person so accused is absent from the State may
not be computed.
IL. REV. STAT. ch. 1063/4,-§ 54 (1975) (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch 40,

§ 1354 (1977)).
77. The lawyers for the plaintiffs argued that the Paternity Act was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection to illegitimate children by
requiring their mothers to establish paternity within two years in order to
sue for support whereas mothers of legitimates may sue for support any
time during the child's minority. Id. at 78, 344 N.E.2d at 450-52.
78. See text accompanying notes 33-39 supra.
79. See Brown v. Box, 38 Ill. 2d 80, 82, 230 N.E.2d 204, 205 (1967). In this
case a paternity action was brought after the statutory two-year period had
elapsed but the court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
under the applicable statute.
80. 63 1. 2d at 87-88, 344 N.E.2d at 454-55.
81. See Helle v. Brush, 53 Ill. 2d 405, 410, 292 N.E.2d 372, 375 (1973) (the
court applied estoppel to keep a statutory notice requirement from acting
as a bar to the right, but it warned that it could not do this if the notice
requirement were a condition precedent to bringing the suit).
82. 63 M. 2d at 87, 344 N.E.2d at 454.

83. Id.
84. Id.
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are often emotionally involved, and hence, a plaintiff may be
lulled into not pursuing her cause of action within the specified
time period. For example, the father of an illegitimate child
could support the child for two years and then rely upon the expired statutory time period as an absolute defense to escape a
subsequent eighteen-year support obligation. 85 Realizing the
likelihood of this possibility, the Cessna court refused to allow
the statutory limitation to bar petitioner's claim. 86 The court
87
noted that this reasoning had been adopted by other states.
The Cessna court employed a balancing test to reach its decision. The potential unfairness to the plaintiff, that would result
from a strict construction of the limitation period, was weighed
against the policy permeating the entire statute. In this respect,
the court perceived that the general policy of the statute should
not be impeded by one specific section of the statute, the limitation period. 88 This policy should prevail even though the legislature had provided within the statute the means to toll the
running of the limitation period, which was not available in this
situation.89 Thus, the Cessna court incorporated a procedural interpretation into the statutory period prescribed by the legislature in order to promote the indirect policy behind the paternity
statute -fairness. Equitable principles that are based on the
concept of fairness were employed to further the goal of the statutory action.
An Illinois Appellate Court9° in Kristan v. Belmont Community Hospital adopted this reasoning and looked to the legislative intent in holding section 24(a) of the Limitation Act 9 ' to be
applicable where a substantive time period had expired during
the pendency of the first action. This section allows for the filing
of a new action where a case has been dismissed for want of
prosecution.9 2 The court stated that the purpose underlying section 24(a) was "to afford every defendant a fair opportunity of
85. See note 76 supra for the text of the Paternity Act.

86. 63 111. 2d at 86, 344 N.E.2d at 454.
87. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959); Fetch v.

Buehner, 200 N.W.2d 258 (N.D. 1972) (court held that equitable estoppel
would apply to toll the substantive time limitation on paternity actions).

88. 63 111. 2d at 86, 344 N.E.2d at 455.
89. See note 76 supra for ways the statute provides for the tolling of the
running of the time period.

90. Kristan v. Belmont Community Hosp., 51 Ill.
App. 3d 523, 366 N.E.2d
1068 (1977).

91. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 24(a) (1977).
92. See Franzese v. Trinko, 66 Ill.
2d 136, 361 N.E.2d 585 (1977) (a plaintiff may commence a new action within one year of a dismissal for want of
prosecution without a showing of diligence under § 24(a) of the Limitations
Act); Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp., 66 Ill. 2d 616, 363 N.E.2d 796 (1977) (a
plaintiff has an absolute right to refile his action within one year).
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investigating the circumstances based upon which plaintiff
wishes to impose liability."93 The court reasoned that the legislature had intended this purpose to apply to both common law
and statutorily created actions. Thus the plaintiff's action under
the Wrongful Death Act, which has a two-year substantive time
limitation, 94 was allowed even though ultimately commenced
six years after the cause of action arose.
A

NEW LOOK AT SUBSTANTIVE TIME LIMrrs

Analysis of Cessna and Wood demonstrates that the courts
in Illinois are concerned about the harsh results stemming from
the interpretation of special statutory time limitations as conditions precedent to the right to plead a statutory cause of action.95 Instead of a boilerplate application of these statutory
time limits, the courts are balancing the potential unfairness to
a plaintiff of having a right extinguished when he has been
lulled from pursuing a statutorily created right against the certainty afforded a defendant that he no longer be concerned
about potential liability. 96 In this balancing process, a major fac97
tor to be recognized is the controlling purpose of the statute.
With a time limit for bringing a statutory action that creates a
right unknown at common law, this balance of interests requires
ascertaining the controlling purpose of the statute. 98 If the court
finds that the basic purpose will be negated by interpreting the
limitation as a condition precedent, then the court will refuse to
follow this rationale and construe the time period as a procedural statute of limitation. Thus, through the application of this
balancing approach, the equitable doctrines that were previously applicable only to a general statute of limitations are now
appropriate in the context of special statutory time periods. 99
The salient feature of this new test is the requirement that
the court analyze each factual situation before determining
whether the policy of the applicable statute will be subverted by
interpreting the statutory period as a condition precedent. l 0
This test is predicated upon the court's deducing the subjective
intent of the legislature in passing the statute and seeing that
this intent prevails in enforcing the statute. This extended in51 IlW. App. 3d at 528, 366 N.E.2d at 1071 (1977).
See note 3 supra.
See notes 54-94 and accompanying text supra.
See 63 111. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976).
Id. at 83-84, 344 N.E.2d at 454-55 (1976).
Id.
99. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
100. See Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Il. 2d at 81, 344 N.E.2d at 455.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

594

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 11:579

quiry represents a recent shift in policy by the courts, demonstrating a concern that the intent of the legislature be promoted,
not circumvented, by the judicially created rule of substantive
time periods.
Most statutory actions are enacted in response to recurring
situations where those adversely affected do not possess an adequate right or remedy. To alleviate the injustice attendant in
these circumstances, the legislature will often create a new statutory cause of action. 10 1 A court, after delving into the legislative
history of an act to discover the wrong to be rectified, should not
permit the wrong to persist through a unilateral interpretation
of time periods as substantive. Thus, by applying the more practical balancing approach, the court assures that the equities
favorable to both parties are considered in deciding whether a
procedural or substantive interpretation of a statutory time period should govern in a particular case. By comparing the competing interests involved in order to ascertain the legislative
purpose of a statutory action, it can be argued that the continued interpretation of some time periods as substantive should
be abolished. This argument is premised on the fact that legislative actions creating statutory rights are intended to correct
wrongs left unremedied in the past. Hence, the availability of
the remedy should control in any factual situation within the
scope of the statute.
In advancing this contention, the rules of statutory interpretation come immediately to the forefront. Two questions present
themselves: whether such a construction is a legitimate interpretation of these statutory actions; and whether this interpretation is within the authority of the judiciary.
Statutory Interpretation
The canon that courts should interpret statutes to achieve a
just or fair result permeates our concept of law. 0 2 It is generally
accepted that the court's function in construing statutes is to
give full effect to the intent of the legislature. 0 3 In doing so, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain all the various intents be101. It is apparent from the legislative history of statutes which create
new actions that the driving motive of the legislature is fairness. See note 62
supra and note 102 infra.

102. If our system of law is to be practical, our statutory laws must be
governed by the principles of justice and humanity. E. CRAwFoRD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 549 (1940).
103. Mr. Justice Reed stated: "In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give
effect to the intent of Congress." United States v. American Trucking Ass'n,
310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION
AND APPLICATION OF STATUrES

13 (1975).
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hind any piece of legislation since the rationale behind any individual section may not be entirely consistent with the main
thrust of the legislation. The courts, however, are not confined to
the written legislation itself in arriving at its meaning. 10 4 They
are permitted to search for the subjective intent of the legislapervading the statutes and
ture in order to ascertain the policy
10 5
then to interpret it accordingly.
The problem occurs when a court overrules a particular section of a statute that in some context is contrary to the overall
policy underlying the legislature's enactment of the statute. If
"intention" refers to the subjective state of mind of the legislature, then it would be a mere technicality to let a word or phrase
of a section determine the outcome when other indicators point
with assurance to the legislature's purpose. 10 6 By rejecting such
a technical approach, the Cessna and Wood courts were able to
avoid an undesirable result that otherwise would have ensued,
while simultaneously ensuring that the policy of the acts was
advanced.
Rejection of Substantive Time Limitations
The remaining question is whether the distinction between
substantive and procedural limitation periods should endure. A
number of commentators have criticized this distinction as creating artificial labels from which the court selects depending
upon the results sought.'0 7 Substantive time limits, like general
limitations, are phrased in terms stating when an action should
be commenced. 10 8 Although the language is sometimes identical,'0 9 substantive time limitations are interpreted to bar the assertion of an underlying right, 110 while limitations construed as
procedural bar only the remedy, and not the right."' The substantive time limits concept originally emerged from a conflict of
laws question where the Supreme Court reviewed an action that
104. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
105. Sir William Blackstone wrote:

The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legisla-

tor is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by
signs the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the
words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or
the spirit and reason of the law.
Quoted in H. HART, JR. & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1201 (1958).

106. Id. at 1225.
107.

See note 112 infra.

108.
109.
110.
111.

See generally statutes cited in note 3 supra.
See note 43 supra.
See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
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was barred in the state that had created the right but was not
barred in the forum state. 112 In concluding that the action was
also barred in the forum state by applying a substantive interpretation, the Court was primarily concerned with eliminating
113
forum shopping.
Recently, legislatures have alleviated forum shopping by enacting borrowing statutes that forbid a forum state to allow the
commencement of an action after the time limitation specified
in the state statute creating the right has expired. 114 Since borrowing statutes prevent a plaintiff from extending his right beyond that given in the state where his cause of action arose, he
will not be able to forum shop for the purpose of securing a
greater period of time within which to bring his action."l 5 The
legislative enactment of borrowing statutes has cured the problem upon which The Harrisburgreasoning was focused. Therefore, the substantive interpretation of time period is no longer
necessary to alleviate forum shopping.
Although eliminating the possibility of forum shopping, the
reasoning in The Harrisburgcreated a dichotomy in stating that
a limitation period in a statute creating a right unknown at common law is substantive, while a general statute of limitations is
116
procedural. This dichotomy has not gone without criticism.
112. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
113. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
114. See note 14 supra for examples of borrowing statutes.
115. See Kalmich v. Bruno, 553 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1977) (Illinois borrowing
statute is a rule of exclusion whereby actions brought in an Illinois forum,
not barred by the applicable Illinois statute of limitations, are denied en-

forcement if barred by the statute of the place where the cause of action
arose). See also Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D.
1Il. 1969) (where nonresidents of Illinois brought action in Illinois against
manufacturer of airplane involved in a crash in Italy, the Italian statute of
limitations applied).
116. See Ailes, Limitations ofActions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 MICH.

L REv. 474, 493 (1933) ("[TIhe conclusion is irresistible that statutes are
often labelled 'substantive' or 'procedural' depending upon the results
sought."). Justice Frankfurter stated that "'[S]ubstance' and 'procedure'
are the same keywords to very different problems.... The line between
substance and procedure shifts as the legal concept changes." Guaranty
Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). "Since a general statute of
limitations cannot be regarded as a qualification of a common law right,
there seems no logical reason for holding the reverse merely because the
right arose under the statute, and the limitation was made particularly applicable to it." Note, Foreign Statute of Limitations, 18 HARv. L. REV. 220,

221 (1905).
In describing the test laid down in The Harrisburg,known as the specificity test, one commentator stated:
The rationale of the test (specificity] is that some limitations are intended to limit rights while others are intended to merely give effect to
a general procedural policy. It is doubtful whether such fine distinctions concerning legislative intent actually exist or can be accurately
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This rule has caused some unfortunate consequences, especially with respect to the availability of equitable doctrines that

postpone the running of a procedural period but are not applica11 7
ble to postpone the operation of substantive time periods.

When the substantive time period is in a federal statute, 1 8
the need for uniformity in the enforcement of federal rights may
seem a sufficient justification to disregard any state exceptions
to the time limitation. Still, it is doubtful whether the equitable
results supposedly achieved by the proposed exceptions to the
running of the limitation period should be blindly sacrificed to
the factor of uniformity. 119 It can be argued that when a state
legislature creates a new right with its own limitation period,
there exists no general intent to reject such equitable exceptions. 120 Thus, where the application of these equitable exceptions to a limitation period would not frustrate the legislative
ascertained. Even assuming that they do exist, it may be argued that
these distinctions are not relevant to the selection of the appropriate
statute of limitations under conflicts of law.
Note, Specificity Test as Exclusive Criterion Bars Application of Foreign
Statute of Limitations, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1072, 1075 (1955). The United
States Supreme Court, in certain circumstances, has refused to make a constitutional distinction predicated on anything as "unsubstantial" as the difference between substantive and procedural statutes of limitations. Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1952).
117. See Messenger v. Rutherford, 80 Ill. App. 2d 25, 225 N.E.2d 94 (1967).
Plaintiff, as executor of decedent, sought to recover from defendant on an
account reportedly made shortly before decedent's death. Defendant counterclaimed on the ground that decedent had committed fraud. The court
dismissed the counterclaim on grounds that it was barred by Probate Act,
IL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 204 (1977). The court held that fraud would not toll
the limitations period of the statute. Accord, Westcott v. Henshaw Motor
Co., 275 Mass. 82, 175 N.E. 153 (1931) (statutory one-year period for bringing
actions for wrongful death from motor vehicles held exclusive and not affected by statute tolling limitation period during defendant's residence
outside of state); Smith v. Eureka Pipe Line Co., 122 W. Va. 277, 8 S.E.2d 890
(1940) (the statute permitting actions commenced within due time and
abated or dismissed involuntarily to be reinstated within one year does not
grant that right in an action under Wrongful Death Statute).
It is notable at this point that Louisiana has taken the position that all
exceptions to general statutes of limitations are applicable to substantive
time limits.
118. See text of Federal Truth in Lending Act at note 55 supra. For further discussion of the need for uniformity under federal statutes, see H.R.
Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947).
119. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959). The
Court in applying estoppel as a defense to a substantive time period stated
that where one by "his conduct induced the other party to a transaction to
give him an advantage which it would be against equity and good conscience for him to assert, he would not in a court of justice be permitted to
avail himself of that advantage."
120. See statutes cited in notes 3 and 55 supra. A reading of statutes with
their own limitation period does not reveal an intent on the part of the legislature to create substantive time limits. The wording is similar to that found
in procedural limitation periods.
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intent, then postponement or suspension of the period would, in
fact, further the general purpose of the legislature.
The Supreme Court in Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District
Terminal'2' held that estoppel was applicable to bar the asserted defense that the time period expired in which to bring a
cause of action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act
(FELA).1 22 The FELA created a new cause of action and limited
the time for commencing suit. In deciding the case, Justice
Black relied upon the maxim that "no man may take advantage
of his own wrong.' 2 3 In Glus, the Court reasoned that the principle of estoppel is available against the substantive time period
in the FELA. Consistent with this view, certain state courts have
taken the position that all such equitable exceptions are applicable to any time limitation even though it had previously been
construed as substantive. 124 Thus, the Supreme Court and certain state courts have eroded the substantive time limit interpretation by applying equitable principles to toll the running of
the time period.
Arguably, substantive time limits should always have been
subjected to equitable considerations. In The Harrisburg, the
Court did not face the specific question whether equitable doctrines were capable of contravening the defense of time limita125
tions since this argument was not raised by the plaintiff.
Furthermore, one can argue that substantive time limitations
are susceptible to equitable considerations by reasoning that
the limitation period refers only to the effect of the expiration of
the time limit; it does not designate the exact moment of expiration. Thus, equitable doctrines could always have been applied
to substantive time periods to toll their running.
CONCLUSION

For the first time, the courts in Illinois are using equitable
doctrines to avoid the harsh results that sometimes accompany
interpretations of specific statutory time limitations as substantive. 26 This new interpretation contravenes the holding in Wilson v. Tromly and its progeny, 127 although these cases have not
121. 359 U.S. 231 (1959).
122. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1939).
123. 359 U.S. at 232.
124. Mitchell v. Sklar, 196 So. 392 (La. 1940) (Louisiana has taken the position that all equitable exceptions are applicable to substantive time limits).
125. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
126. See Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill.
2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976); Wood
Acceptance v. King, 18 Ill.
App. 3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403 (1973).
127. See note 4 supra.
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been expressly overruled. The interpretation of specific statutory time limitations as substantive elements of the cause of action is no longer necessary due to the incorporation of
borrowing statutes. 128 The original interpretation of specific
time limits as substantive was based on the notion that it was
unfair to allow a party to extend his cause of action by bringing
it in one state when the action would have been barred if
brought in the state that created the right. 129 Since this interpretation is now unnecessary to alleviate this problem, the courts
have returned to the ultimate goal of fairness by applying a new
30
interpretation to these time periods.
In Illinois, the legislature has established that when a party
is sued, he has a right to file a counterclaim.' 3 ' In the past, this
principle was thwarted in cases where specific time limitations
were considered to be substantive. 32 Today, with the courts'
new interpretation, many of these counterclaims will now be allowed. This problem could be characterized as legislative in
that, if the legislature had intended to allow counterclaims to be
filed, it should have so provided in statutes. Yet, it was the judiciary who developed the doctrine of substantive time limits, and
therefore, it is only appropriate that the judiciary assume the
responsibility in rectifying the harsh results that have occasionally stemmed from this interpretation.
This new approach of the Illinois courts in reference to special statutory time limits has the capability of emasculating the
harsh results attendant with the substantive interpretation of
time limits. Such interpretations should not be employed where
the original reason for their utility has been obviated by other
means. This fact, plus the inequitable results from such interpretation, raises serious questions about the validity and desirability of maintaining this approach. The courts in Illinois should
be encouraged by the legal community to reject a strict substantive interpretation of statutory time periods. In doing so, the legal community will be fulfilling one of its primary obligations to
society: to ensure that the law clearly reflects the changing
133
needs and demands of our society.
Daniel D. Maynard
128. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
129. See The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
130. See, e.g., Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959);
Cessna v. Montgomery, 63 Ill. 2d 71, 344 N.E.2d 447 (1976); Wood Acceptance
v. King, 18 Ill. App. 3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403 (1973).
131. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, § 18 (1977).
132. See note 4 supra.
133. Hutchins, The Autobiography of an Ex-Law Student, 1 U. Cm. L.
REV. 511, 511-12 (1934).

